"K"; and C<LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF> matches the sequence "ff", which,
if you're not prepared, might make it look like a hexadecimal constant,
presenting another potential security issue. See
-L<http://unicode.org/reports/tr36> for a detailed discussion of Unicode
+L<https://unicode.org/reports/tr36> for a detailed discussion of Unicode
security issues.
This modifier may be specified to be the default by C<use feature
A zero-width positive lookahead assertion. For example, C</\w+(?=\t)/>
matches a word followed by a tab, without including the tab in C<$&>.
-The alphabetic forms are experimental; using them yields a warning in the
-C<experimental::alpha_assertions> category.
-
=item C<(?!I<pattern>)>
=item C<(*nla:I<pattern>)>
the next thing cannot be "foo"--and it's not, it's a "bar", so "foobar" will
match. Use lookbehind instead (see below).
-The alphabetic forms are experimental; using them yields a warning in the
-C<experimental::alpha_assertions> category.
-
=item C<(?<=I<pattern>)>
=item C<\K>
Use of the non-greedy modifier C<"?"> may not give you the expected
results if it is within a capturing group within the construct.
-The alphabetic forms (not including C<\K> are experimental; using them
-yields a warning in the C<experimental::alpha_assertions> category.
-
=item C<(?<!I<pattern>)>
=item C<(*nlb:I<pattern>)>
Use of the non-greedy modifier C<"?"> may not give you the expected
results if it is within a capturing group within the construct.
-The alphabetic forms are experimental; using them yields a warning in the
-C<experimental::alpha_assertions> category.
-
=back
=item C<< (?<I<NAME>>I<pattern>) >>
does not.
-The alphabetic form (C<(*atomic:...)>) is experimental; using it
-yields a warning in the C<experimental::alpha_assertions> category.
-
=item C<(?[ ])>
See L<perlrecharclass/Extended Bracketed Character Classes>.
In Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, it is common for text to have a mixture of
characters from their native scripts and base Chinese. Perl follows
-Unicode's UTS 39 (L<http://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>) Unicode Security
+Unicode's UTS 39 (L<https://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>) Unicode Security
Mechanisms in allowing such mixtures. For example, the Japanese scripts
Katakana and Hiragana are commonly mixed together in practice, along
with some Chinese characters, and hence are treated as being in a single
L</(*ACCEPT) (*ACCEPT:arg)> and not have it bypass the script run
checking.
-This feature is experimental, and the exact syntax and details of
-operation are subject to change; using it yields a warning in the
-C<experimental::script_run> category.
-
The C<Script_Extensions> property as modified by UTS 39
-(L<http://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>) is used as the basis for this
+(L<https://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>) is used as the basis for this
feature.
To summarize,
Inherited script and/or a single other script.
The script of a character is determined by the C<Script_Extensions>
-property as modified by UTS 39 (L<http://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>), as
+property as modified by UTS 39 (L<https://unicode.org/reports/tr39/>), as
described above.
=item 3